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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
William Thomas Scott, Jr., appeals from the judgment of conviction
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of delivery of a controlled
substance within 1,000 feet of a school. Scott claims his conviction should be
reversed due to statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument to which
he did not object at trial.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Law enforcement arranged a controlled methamphetamine buy between
Theresa Staker, a "confidential informant," and Scott. (Tr., p.54, Ls.1-23; p.117,
Ls.9-18.) Law enforcement recorded telephone calls between Scott and Staker
planning the purchase,

recorded

the actual transaction,

and

conducted

surveillance when the buy occurred. (Tr., p.117, L.9 - p.122, L.6.) A few weeks
following the controlled buy, Scott was arrested and charged with delivery of
methamphetamine with an enhancement because the delivery occurred within
1,000 feet of a secondary school. (Tr., p.146, Ls.5-11; R., pp.65-66.)
The state and Scott initially entered into a plea agreement in which Scott
pied guilty and the state agreed to recommend no more than retained jurisdiction.
(R., pp.85-99.)

After Scott pied guilty, but prior to sentencing, the Idaho Court

of Appeals issued an opinion holding that the sentencing enhancement for
delivery within 1,000 feet of a school required imposition of a mandatory term of
confinement, thereby precluding the court from accepting the state's retained
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jurisdiction recommendation as contemplated by the agreement.

1

Consequently,

Scott filed a motion to modify the plea agreement, which was denied, but the
court allowed Scott to instead withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to a stipulation by
the parties.

(R., pp.108-116, 127-130, 142-144.) The case proceeded to trial

after which a jury convicted Scott of delivery of a controlled substance within
1,000 feet of a school. (R., pp.239-250, 283-284.) The court thereafter entered
judgment imposing a unified ten-year sentence with five years fixed from which
Scott timely appealed. (R., pp.295-298, 303-305.)

1

State v. Patterson, 148 Idaho 166,170,219 P.3d 813, 817 (Ct App. 2009).
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ISSUE
Scott states the issue on appeal as:
Did the State's arguments - eight times - that its evidence was
uncontradicted or undisputed constitute fundamental error in
violation of Mr. Scott's Fifth Amendment right not to testify?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Scott failed to establish he is entitled to relief based upon the
prosecutor's closing arguments to which he did not object?
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ARGUMENT
Scott Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His Unpreserved
Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
A.

Introduction
Scott claims the

prosecutor's

comments during

closing

argument

regarding the "undisputed" evidence at trial, which were not objected to,
constituted misconduct amounting to fundamental error. (Appellant's Brief, pp.512.)

Application of the legal standards governing such claims demonstrates

Scott has failed to show he is entitled to any relief.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved

for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _ , 245
P.3d 961, 976 (201 O) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first time
on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as
fundamental error. l!;l at 980.

C.

Scott Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In Relation To The
Prosecutor's Closing Argument
During closing argument, the prosecutor went through the elements

instruction and noted the evidence was "undisputed" with regard to the following
elements: (1) the date of the offense; (2) the location of the offense; (3) and the
identification of the substance as methamphetamine.

(Supp. Tr., p.29, L.9 -

p.30, L.21.) Continuing his review of the elements, the prosecutor stated:
Also contained within point number three, that it was William
Scott, the defendant in this case, that delivered that
4

methamphetamine. That evidence is also uncontradicted and
undisputed. Every witness who had any connection to this case as
far as the controlled buy or the surveillance connected William
Scott to that controlled buy in some way. First of all, Theresa
Staker, very brave initially working as a confidential informant
[testified] ....
She had to face Mr. Scott, the man who sold her that
methamphetamine, and identify him publically in court. She did
that, and that identification was undisputed. And she testified that
she had some history with Mr. Scott; that they had been friends for
a period of time; that they knew each other, so this is not a situation
where you have an eye witness trying to identify a stranger. She's
identifying someone that she knows, someone that she recognizes
and has done things with.
Her testimony, again, is that he sold her or delivered her
methamphetamine, and there is no evidence to contradict that. In
fact, all of the other evidence introduced in this trial corroborates or
supports her testimony.
(Supp. Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.31, L.24.)
In addition to reviewing the elements instruction for delivery, the
prosecutor also discussed Instruction No. 16, which advised the jury that it must
determine whether the delivery occurred "on or within 1,000 feet" of school
property.

(R., p.272.) With respect to the state's allegation that the delivery

occurred within 1,000 feet of Burley Junior High School, the prosecutor asserted
the evidence on that point ''was completely uncontradicted," stating:
The delivery took place there on 13th Street. That location was
pinpointed very accurately. The police officer measured that
distance, and not even going in a straight line but actually taking
the long way was still well under 1,000 feet to the property of that
Burley Junior High School. The evidence was it was a public
school, and it was a secondary school. And that grassy area that
he measured to is part of the property of that junior high school.
The principal even went so far as to explain that the students
actively use that part of the field for classes, for PE, for different
things like that. And if you add up the distances, it comes to
5

somewhere around 778 feet, and that's even if you're not taking the
shortest possible distance from that location to the school property.
(Supp. Tr., p.36, Ls.6-22.)
Later, in rebuttal, after Scott argued, in essence, that there was
reasonable doubt because Staker was not credible and the state failed to present
any evidence other than her testimony that he was the one in the car who
delivered the methamphetamine to her (see generally Supp. Tr., pp.38-43), the
prosecutor stated:
We do have to rely on Theresa Staker to some extent, and
that's why the police do everything they can to follow all these rules
and regulations. All of the evidence is documented. They fill out all
of this paperwork. . . . They do everything they can to make sure
all of this is on the up-and-up, and there simply is no reasonable
explanation other than William Scott sold this methamphetamine to
Theresa Staker.
You heard her testimony.
You saw her
demeanor. You saw that she was trying to be open. She was
being honest. She was telling you what happened, and that
evidence is uncontradicted.
Again, even though there was not a law enforcement officer
literally standing there watching the transaction, they saw William
Scott's car going to the transaction. You hear the tapes. They saw
how quickly it happened. They see his vehicle leaving that area.
They follow it to this home on Conant. They see him right after he's
gotten out of the car. That's a very strong corroboration.
You can argue that every witness has some kind of bias or
some kind of motive. Theresa Staker was an informant. She was
being compensated. Part of her agreement was that she had to
promise to tell the truth. You'll see that in the paperwork. It was an
agreement that was approved by the prosecuting attorney of
Minidoka County. This wasn't just a police officer deciding to do
something on a whim. They went through all of the right steps
here. She was under oath. She promised to tell the truth, and
there was [no] evidence to contradict that.
(Supp Tr., p.48, L.22 - p.50, L. 7.)
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Although Scott did not object to any of the prosecutor's statements, and
even though Scott acknowledges the prosecutor did not "directly" imply guilt
based on his failure to testify, Scott nevertheless claims his conviction should be
vacated as a result of the prosecutor's use of the word "undisputed" during
closing argument and his characterization of the evidence as uncontradicted.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-12.) In order to prevail on this claim, Scott must satisfy
the three-part test articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Perry:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
150 Idaho at

245 P.3d 978.

Application of the foregoing standard to Scott's claim of unpreserved error
demonstrates he has failed to meet his burden of establishing he is entitled to
reversal of his conviction.
Scott argues he satisfies the first prong of Perry because the prosecutor's
comments violated his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. (Appellant's Brief,
p.11.) According to Scott, his Fifth Amendment right was violated because he
was the only witness who could have contradicted the evidence presented.
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Although it may be true that Scott was the only person
who could contradict Staker's claim that he was the one in the car who sold her
the methamphetamine, not all of the prosecutor's statements of which Scott
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complains were related to this point. For example, the date of the incident, the
location of the controlled buy, including the fact that it occurred within 1,000 feet
of a school, and the identification of the substance sold as methamphetamine
could have been contradicted by someone other than Scott. See, ~ . State v.
Hodges,

105

Idaho 588,

591-592,

671

P.2d

1051,

1054-1055 (1983)

(prosecutor's remark that testimony regarding nature of substance as cocaine
was "uncontradicted" did not constitute an impermissible reference to the
defendant's failure to testify, but was "a comment on the weight of the evidence
produced").

Any argument that the prosecutor's comments regarding the

undisputed nature of this evidence violated Scott's Fifth Amendment right lacks
merit and fails to satisfy Scott's burden of showing a constitutional violation as
required under the first prong of Perry.
Scott's complaints about the prosecutor's use of the word "undisputed" in
relation to Staker's testimony identifying him as the person who sold her the
methamphetamine and the prosecutor's characterization of her testimony as
uncontradicted also fails to establish a Fifth Amendment violation. In support of
his argument to the contrary, Scott relies on State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312,
143 P.3d 400 (Ct App. 2006). In McMurry, the Court stated: "Idaho follows the
overwhelming number of jurisdictions holding that a prosecutor's general
references to uncontradicted evidence do not necessarily reflect on the
defendant's failure to testify, where witnesses other than the defendant could
have contradicted the evidence." 143 Idaho at 314, 143 P.3d at 402 (emphasis
original). The Court continued:
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Looking at the comments in context, including the likely
effect of any curative instructions, we must decide whether the
language used was manifestly intended or was of such character
that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a
comment on the failure of the accused to testify. Although a
prosecutor may not intend an inference of guilt, sufficiently
ambiguous language indicates indirect . . . error under the
objective portion of this test. An "inference on inference," however,
does not naturally or necessarily make an indirect comment on
defendant's silence.
McMurry, 143 Idaho at 315, 143 P.3d at 403 (internal quotations and citations
omitted, emphasis original).
Looking at the prosecutor's comments in this case "in context," there was
no manifest intent to comment on Scott's failure to testify, nor was the language
used "of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be
a comment" thereon.

Rather, the intent of the prosecutor's argument was to

demonstrate that Staker's testimony, which Scott challenged as not credible, was
in fact corroborated by other evidence in the case, including the recorded phone
calls and the surveillance conducted by law enforcement before, during, and after
the controlled buy.

Moreover, the state was entitled to respond to Scott's

challenge to Staker's credibility by highlighting the fact that the only evidence
presented corroborated her testimony instead of contradicting it. See Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986) ("[t]he prosecutors' comments must be
evaluated in light of the defense argument that preceded it"); State v. Severson,
147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 P.3d 414, 439 (2009) (citation and quotations omitted)
(prosecutor's arguments must be evaluated "in light of defense conduct and in
the context of the entire trial")

McMurry, 143 Idaho at 315, 143 P.3d at 403

(citation and quotations omitted) ("a prosecutor may rebut defense counsel's
9

arguments and defenses" even though "the line between a legitimate rebuttal of
the defense arguments and an indirect comment on the fact that the defendant
has not taken the stand is often a very thin one"). Under the facts of this case,
Scott has failed to show constitutional error.
Even if the prosecutor's statements that the evidence was undisputed
resulted in constitutional error, Scott has failed to establish either that the error
was clear or obvious and the lack of objection was not the result of a tactical
decision or that the result of the trial would have been different absent the
prosecutor's comments. With respect to the second prong of Perry, Scott argues
the error "is plain from the record" because the "terminology - uncontradicted or
undisputed - [was] disfavored by the Court in McMurry and by other appellate
courts considering the issue in a case in which the defendant is the only witness
who could have contradicted the State's evidence."

(Appellant's Brief, p.11.)

This argument fails for at least two reasons.
First, the mere use of even "disfavored" language does not mean there
was error.

Rather, as the Court made clear in McMurry, the analysis must

consider the language "in context, including the likely effect of any curative
instruction," and, as stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Severson, the
prosecutor's statements must be evaluated "in light of defense conduct and in the
context of the entire trial."

147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 (citation and

quotations omitted). Thus, it is not enough to conclude there was error based on
the prosecutor's choice of words alone.

See also Darden, 477 U.S. at 181

(internal quotations and citations omitted) ("[l]t is not enough that the prosecutors'
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remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.

The relevant

question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.").
Second, Scott's plain error argument ignores that portion of the
fundamental error analysis requiring consideration of whether trial counsel's
failure to object was the result of a tactical decision. Counsel's decision not to
object to the prosecutor's closing argument could have been a tactical decision
based on a variety of factors none of which can be ascertained from the record.
For example, trial counsel may think objecting during closing argument does not
play well to a jury, or trial counsel, rather than objecting, may prefer to respond or
capitalize on the state's closing argument instead of objecting to it. Indeed, it is
possible trial counsel did at least the latter in this case as potentially illustrated by
the following statement he made during his closing argument:
state says this is undisputed, no, it is disputed.

"So when the

The state misstates.

It is

disputed. The state's job is to prove that it's beyond a reasonable doubt, and I
don't think they've done that." (Supp. Tr., p.41, L.25 - p.42, L.4.)

If, in fact,

counsel did make a tactical decision not to object, such a decision will generally
not be second-guessed on appeal and would not warrant reversal.

State v.

Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 566 n.8, 199 P.3d 123, 141 n.8 (2008). Regardless of
what can be speculated regarding counsel's motives, however, it cannot be said
that there is "no need for any additional information not contained in the appellate
record." Perry, supra. Scott's claim that he has satisfied the second prong of
Perry, therefore, fails.
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Scott has also failed to satisfy the third prong of Perry because he has not
met his burden of demonstrating the argument affected the outcome of the trial.
Beyond Staker's testimony that Scott was the individual who delivered the
metharnphetamine to her, the state also presented evidence from investigating
officers that corroborated

Staker's identification of Scott as the dealer.

Specifically, Detective Kevin Horak testified that he recorded calls between
Staker and Scott wherein Staker arranged to buy the methamphetamine from
Scott, and Detective Horak was able to identify Scott's voice on the recordings.
(Tr., p.117, L.9 - p.122, L.6.) Detective Horak also placed a recording device on
Staker, which she wore during the controlled buy, and Detective Horak was able
to identify Scott's voice on the "buy wire" as well. (Tr., p.120, L.2 - p.122, L.6.)
Further, the vehicle driven by the individual who delivered the methamphetamine
to Staker during the controlled buy was registered to Scott, Scott was seen
walking from that same vehicle to a house in a manner indicating he had just
driven it, and Scott was later arrested while standing near that vehicle.

(Tr.,

p.141, L.6 - p.146, L.23.) Thus, contrary to Scott's argument, this case was not
"based almost exclusively on the testimony of one drug-addicted, drug-dealing
police informant." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.)
Moreover, Scott has failed to show any basis for concluding the jury
disregarded the court's instructions that the prosecutor's arguments did not
constitute evidence (R., pp.254, 278}, that it must only consider evidence in
determining guilt (R., p.256), that it was not to draw any inference of guilt from
Scott's decision not to testify (R., p.273}, and that it must follow all the court's
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instructions (R., p.256), and instead convicted him based on the prosecutor's
closing argument. See State v. Carson, --- P.3d ----, 2011 VvL 5299708 (2011)
(rejecting

argument that prosecutor committed

misconduct in

explaining

reasonable doubt because the court's instructions were correct and jurors were
presumed to follow the court's instructions). To the contrary, because the jury is
presumed to follow the court's instructions and because the evidence of Scott's
guilt was significant, Scott has not and cannot demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the

prosecutor's

use of the word

"undisputed"

or his

characterization of the state's evidence as uncontradicted affected the outcome
of the trial. Thus, even assuming Scott could satisfy the first two prongs of Perry,
he is still not entitled to relief under the third prong.
Because Scott has failed to establish the prosecutor's closing argument
constituted fundamental error, he has failed to demonstrate his conviction should
be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Scott's judgment of
conviction for delivery of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2011.

JESSICA 1}11. LORELLO
Deputy 'f\tforney General
'-,/
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of December 2011, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
SPENCER J. HAHN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

JES~):t M. LORELLO
Depv .ttorney General
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